









A rapidly aging population means the Atlantic provinces face the prospect 
of shrinking workforces as early as 2010. To stem the population pressures 
of tomorrow, a suite of policies – such as those that boost workforce
participation and others that prefund demographically sensitive government
programs – is needed for today.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONThe twin demographic challenges of an aging population and slow workforce
growth will affect Canada’s Atlantic provinces more acutely than other regions of the
country. Many years of low birthrates and youth outmigration mean that the
Atlantic region faces diminished workforce growth and a fiscal squeeze as fewer
taxpayers support a growing bill for public programs. The scarcity of population-
attracting large urban centres in the region is a sobering fact for those hoping to
address Atlantic Canada’s demographic pressures through large inward flows of
migrants. 
This multifaceted challenge requires a multifaceted response to encourage work,
foster investments in human and physical capital, and ensure fiscal sustainability.
Boosting workforce productivity will need concerted action from providers of
elementary, secondary and post-secondary education, as well as from employers and
other promoters of adult literacy. Dealing with the looming fiscal challenge will
require courage and imaginative approaches such as CPP-style pre-funding for
health programs that face sharp demographically driven spending increases. 
Successfully addressing the stresses of demographic change in Atlantic Canada will
require not only a combination of policies from various provincial government
departments, but also action by the federal government and employers to increase
workforce retention and immigration by people of working age.
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T
he population of Canada’s
Atlantic provinces is aging
faster than those of other
provinces and territories. Challenges
such as the sustainability of fiscal
policy, the expansion and limits of
public health services and the
intergenerational fairness of current
provincial tax regimes are therefore
more pressing in New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova
Scotia and Prince Edward Island than
elsewhere in the country. 
A shrinking workforce, coupled with rising costs
associated with an older population, will force
changes on the current trajectories of taxes and public
services.
Even should the Atlantic Provinces meet their
targets to raise in-migration, or surpass them by
reasonable margins, the momentum of growth and
aging of the already resident population will force
policy changes. In one critical area – providing
medical drugs – an early response seems especially
desirable. Early pre-funding of escalating costs for
pharmacare can mitigate what would otherwise be an
unconscionable burden on future taxpayers. 
This Backgrounder outlines the likely evolution of
the size and age-structure of each Atlantic province’s
population and highlights the potential impacts of
international and interprovincial migration trends on
living standards and fiscal sustainability in the years
ahead. Finally, it canvasses some policy tools to deal
with the challenges. 
Our key conclusions are: 
￿ Mitigating or even reversing the recent
outmigration of young workers from the Atlantic
provinces will not prevent a demographically
driven rise in government spending relative to
income in the decades ahead. Potential savings on
education, as the youth share of the population
declines, are far smaller than increases in
healthcare costs as the elderly share increases. 
￿ Economic growth will face a headwind from
population aging, making policies to improve
workforce productivity imperative. However, the
correlation between higher education and
mobility, evident in a tendency for young people
with higher levels of education to leave Atlantic
Canada, complicates the policy response.
Improving adult literacy skills offers high returns
with less of a threat of subsequent outmigration. 
￿ The Atlantic provinces’ relatively more rural
population, particularly the scarcity of migrant-
attracting urban centres, heightens the challenge
of achieving a better balance of in- versus
outmigration.
￿ Combating these stresses requires a suite of policies
from all levels of government. Improved labour
market outcomes, workforce mobility, adult skill
acquisition, competitive and generationally fair tax
policies and the postponement of retirement are
potentially important measures in attempts to
offset demographic pressures on living standards in
the region.
Demographic Projections
We begin by sketching Atlantic Canada’s
demographic future based on the normal starting
assumption that key variables will remain in familiar
ranges in the future. Because each province has
distinct demographic and economic characteristics,
we project provincial populations separately. The vital
birth and death statistics in our projection are:
￿ Total fertility rates stay constant at 1.5 births per
woman in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick;
1.46 in Newfoundland and Labrador; and 1.63
in Prince Edward Island. 
￿ Life expectancy at birth in each province
improves at rates similar to those in Statistics
Canada’s medium assumption throughout the
projection period.
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
The authors would like to thank the presenters and attendees at the C.D. Howe Institute’s demographic conference in Halifax on May 12, 2009.
Their thoughts, suggestions and comments have contributed significantly to the content of this paper. In addition, we would like to thank the
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and the individual support and guidance of Steve Parker, Aldéa Landry and Colin Dodds, who provided
helpful remarks and advice both before and after the conference. 1 As the population ages, declines in interprovincial migration can be reasonably expected – a trend evident since 1971 (Dion and Coulombe 2008).
2 There are various ways to define rural – see du Plessis et al. (2002) – but all of them bear out this generalization. 
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Future migration levels are an exercise in conjecture.
Convention in demographics is to base future
migration assumptions on recent trends, but such
“straight-line” projections immediately raise doubts
in this instance. Should population losses continue at
recent rates in Newfoundland and Labrador, for
example, the population would shrink to nothing
within 80 years, which is clearly unreasonable.
International migration is one key area of
uncertainty. Canada as a whole attracts relatively
large numbers of immigrants, but the share of
permanent-resident immigrants to the country that
settles in Atlantic Canada has tended to be very small
– less than 3 percent in 2007, for example.
Therefore, one key question is whether the Atlantic
provinces can succeed in raising the number of
immigrants who settle in the region.
Interprovincial migration is another uncertainty.
Past interprovincial net migration, while volatile year
to year, has been mostly outward from Atlantic
Canada (Figure 1). Gross flows in and out have
varied between about 65,000 and 38,000 annually,
with the booming economies of western Canada
pushing net Atlantic outmigration to a recent trough
of about 11,500 in 2006. In an abrupt reversal,
however, 2007 registered net regional immigration
for the first time since 1983. 
Over time, the cyclical population flows within
Canada have shown some tendency toward balance:
as net migration gains of high-growth provinces fall,
there are fewer losses in the low-growth provinces
(Statistics Canada 2005). Opposing forces – aging,
on the one hand, work against mobility,1 while rising
education levels tend to foster it – will also have an
impact in the years ahead.
A further factor that has tended to foster Atlantic
Canada outmigration is the region’s urban/rural split.
The Atlantic provinces are more rural than Canada
as a whole,2 as can be seen in Figure 2 (see Box 1 for
a presentation of this distinction). The Atlantic
provinces contain few metropolises: Halifax, the
region’s largest urban centre (population 373,000), is
Canada’s 14th largest; St. John’s, the second largest,
ranks 20th; and Moncton, Atlantic Canada’s third-
largest city, ranks 29th. The rural share of Atlantic
Canada’s population (8.3 percent) is matched only in
Manitoba and Saskatchewan. All other provinces are
2.6 percent rural or less.
Historically, the significance of this urban-rural
split lies not in any tendency for outmigration from
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Figure 1: Interprovincial Migration Flows in Atlantic Canada, 1971–2007
Source: Cansim Table 051-0012.Backgrounder 120 | 3




















Major Metro 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.7% 55.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 51.5% 38.8%
Mid-sized Metro 0.0% 0.0% 40.8% 0.0% 10.7% 20.8% 55.4% 0.0% 68.0% 8.4% 21.9%
Smaller Metro 49.1% 53.5% 11.6% 57.2% 15.0% 10.7% 0.0% 48.0% 11.9% 12.5% 14.7%
Non-Metro Urban 42.1% 32.8% 38.6% 36.9% 26.9% 12.0% 28.7% 45.5% 18.5% 25.0% 21.4%
Rural 8.8% 13.7% 9.0% 5.9% 1.6% 1.4% 15.9% 6.5% 1.6% 2.6% 3.1%
Nfld. & Lab. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. BC. Can. .
Figure 2: Urban/Rural Population Distribution, 2006
Source: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada 2006 Census.
Metropolitan Regions
￿ Major metropolitan: central and fringe census
divisions (CDs) of urban settlements of one
million or more people.
￿ Mid-sized metropolitan: CDs containing urban
settlements of 250,000 to 999,999 people.
￿ Smaller metropolitan: CDs containing urban
settlements of 50,000 to 249,999.
Non-Metropolitan Regions
￿ Non-metropolitan small city zone: non-
metropolitan CDs containing urban settlements
of 20,000 to 49,999 people.
￿ Small-town zone: non-metropolitan CDs
containing urban settlements of 2,500 to
19,999.
￿ Predominantly rural: non-metropolitan CDs
containing no urban settlements (i.e., no places
of 2,500 or more people).
￿ Northern hinterland: CDs that are entirely or
largely north of the following parallels by
region: Newfoundland and Labrador–50th;
Québec and Ontario–49th; Manitoba–53rd;
Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia–
54th; and all of the Yukon, Northwest
Territories, and Nunavut.





4) Non-Metro Urban (non-metropolitan small-
city zone and small-city zone).
5) Rural (predominantly rural and northern
hinterland).





































































































































































CD In-migration 1996–2001 CD In-migration 2001–2006
CD Outmigration 1996–2001 CD Outmigration 2001–2006
Figure 3: In- and Outmigration Patterns, Atlantic Provinces, Select Urban and Rural Regions
Note: CD = Census division.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada 1996, 2001, and 2006 Census.
greater percentage of their population to
outmigration than rural ones (Figure 3) – but in
relatively low in-migration to more rural regions.
While the future may hold surprises on this front as
well, our working assumption is that the greater
economic opportunities and attractions of a larger
community in urban centres will continue to work
against net migration to rural areas.
To bracket the range of likelier outcomes, we
consider two separate migration scenarios:
￿ A “Pessimistic” Atlantic Canada scenario might
result from a prolonged period of employment
and economic leadership in the western and
central provinces. In this scenario, net
interprovincial outmigration for each Atlantic
province remains negative, but the outflow slowly
shrinks from its 10-year average, in each age and
sex category, becoming zero in 2018. International
immigration for this scenario remains mildly
positive at the latest 10-year average.
￿ An alternative “Optimistic” scenario might result
from an eastward shift in economic leadership
combined with successful policies by the Atlantic
provinces to attract and retain more actual or
potential migrants. In this scenario, each
province surpasses its net in-migration targets.3
International immigration levels reflect the most
recent targets set by each government,4 and net
interprovincial migration is positive at roughly 10
percent of the international migration level.
3 We use the assumptions presented in The New Brunswick Population Growth Secretariat’s “Be Our Future”; Newfoundland and Labrador’s
“Diversity: Opportunity and Growth”; Nova Scotia’s “Immigration Strategy”; and Prince Edward Island’s “Population Strategy.” P.E.I. would like to
see its annual population grow by 1.5 percent. But adjusting migration in each year proved unrealistic: immigration has to grow exponentially to
meet the population target. So we assume that P.E.I.’s population growth targets are met through migration alone, and that migration levels adjust
to allow the population to grow by 1.65 percent up to 2018, and are fixed thereafter. 
4 We consider this feasible given the growth of international migration in Manitoba and its expanded Provincial Nominee Program (Statistics Canada
2008, 12).Backgrounder 120 | 5
Table A1 in the Appendix lists the assumptions and
results of the projections.
These different migration assumptions produce
very different population projections. The pessimistic
scenario demonstrates the sizable effects of another
10 years of population loss through interprovincial
migration (Figure 4). The optimistic scenario is
considerably more buoyant for the region as a whole,
although Newfoundland and Labrador still see
declines. In the pessimistic scenario, Atlantic
Canada’s aggregate population falls to 1.9 million in
50 years’ time; in the optimistic scenario, it increases
to 2.7 million. 
For the last 30 years, the Atlantic provinces have
generally enjoyed significant additions to their
potential workforce, for which we use the common
definition of population aged 18 to 64. Under either
scenario, the potential workforce does not grow in
the decades ahead (Figure 5). In the pessimistic
scenario, it shrinks immediately; in the optimistic
scenario, it briefly grows in three of the four
provinces, but even in them, it plateaus in 2011 and
then starts to decline. 
As the demographic bulge of babyboomers moves
into older age groups, the old-age dependency ratio –
the population aged 65 and over relative to the
working-age population – will rise sharply (Figure 6).
Although migrants are younger on average than
already resident populations, this rise occurs in the
optimistic scenario as well as in the pessimistic one.
Before exploring the implications of this change in
age structure for the sustainability of provincial
programs, we overlay some economic assumptions to
produce alternative futures for output and income
growth in Atlantic Canada. 
Economic Projections
Over the past 10 years, Atlantic Canada’s real GDP
expanded at a per person rate of 3.1 percent
annually. This was the result of an average 2.9
percent annual increase in output per working-age
person and a small rise in the working-age
population relative to the total. To get a sense of
what might be achievable over longer timelines, we
examine the 20-year span from 1989 to 2008,
during which real GDP grew at 2.2 percent per year,
or 1.9 percent per working-age person. For
simplicity, we assume that real GDP per potential
worker will grow by the 1989-2008 average in the
near future and, to mitigate the impact of recent
resource cycles on projected relative growth rates
among the Atlantic provinces, that each province’s
growth per worker will gradually converge to the
regional average over a 20-year period.
This assumption about output per working-age
person, along with the projected shrinking share of
provincial populations of working age, means that
output per person is projected to rise more slowly
than the most recent average under either migration
scenario (Appendix Table A2). 
Fiscal Consequences of 
Demographic Change
Slower workforce growth coupled with a rapid rise in
the share of seniors in the population will have
important fiscal consequences. Barring changes to
the delivery of public services, demographic changes
will force current and future taxpayers in Atlantic
Canada to pay higher tax rates for the same package
of public programs a person of a given age and sex
enjoys today.
To quantify these effects, we take current patterns
of public expenditure by age – and, in the case of
healthcare, by sex – and project them forward as the
age-structure of the population changes.5
Healthcare
The age/sex profile of healthcare spending interacts
with demographic change to create increases in
public healthcare costs.6 We assume that service costs
per person rise in line with the productivity index, at
1.9 percent, and health-sector inflation continues at
the same average annual pace recorded by the price
index of provincial government consumption from
1994 to 2007.7
C.D. Howe Institute
5 See Robson (2009) for a similar exercise carried out for all provinces and territories, and for further explanation of these projection methods.
6 These figures are for 20 different age groups taken from CIHI (2008), Series E. 
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Figure 4: Atlantic Canada Total Population and Workforce (WF) Under Two Migration Scenarios



































































































































































































Figure 5: Workforce Population Growth Rates (ages 18–64), Under Two Migration Scenarios
Source: CANSIM, Authors’ calculations.| 8 Backgrounder 120




































































































































































Figure 6: Old-Age Dependency Ratio (ages 65+/18–64) Under Two Migration Scenarios
Source: CANSIM, Authors’ calculations.Backgrounder 120 | 9
Education
In contrast to rising expenses in healthcare,
demographic change should cause growth in
education expenditures to abate. We project
provincial spending on elementary school and
postsecondary students on the basis of the
populations aged 5 to 17 and 18 to 24, respectively.
Service intensity rises, as with healthcare services per
person, at 1.9 percent annually. Inflation in
education costs is also projected at the same pace as
the price index for provincial government
consumption from 1994 to 2007.8
Seniors’ Programs
Provincial seniors’ programs include the New
Brunswick low-income seniors’ benefit and a
comparable program in Newfoundland and
Labrador, in addition to those provinces’ disability
support supplements and geared-to-age community
programs. Our projections assume that the real
benefits per senior will grow at the same pace as real
payments per person aged 65 and up by the federal
government under Old Age Security (OAS) and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), using the
projections of Canada’s Chief Actuary (OCA 2008).
These provincial programs are not large relative to
their budgets, so their cost increases do not
significantly affect the results. 
Demographically Sensitive Program Spending 
Figure 7 compares the combined impact of
expenditure growth and slower economic growth
from demographic change under alternative
migration scenarios. Since the mid-1980s, even
during periods of substantial outmigration, GDP
growth has contained the share of income absorbed
by demographically sensitive programs in most
provinces. This will not be true in the future, when
all of Canada – and especially the Atlantic region –
will see an increasing share of incomes absorbed by
these programs (Robson 2009).9
Policy Options  
Safeguarding high living standards and boosting
future levels of growth in the face of these trends
requires policies in several areas: 
￿ better labour-market participation incentives and
labour-force flexibility; 
￿ training to improve adult skills and literacy;
￿ improvements in the secondary and
postsecondary education system – which must
fuel growth and better match skill sets to meet
the economy’s needs – and equipping workers
with better tools to do their jobs; 
￿ attracting, integrating and retaining new
migrants in the workforce; 
￿ containing rising program costs and sharing
them more fairly among generations. 
Labour-Market Performance and
Workforce Participation 
Simple population projections can provide relatively
reliable overall numbers. However, when it comes to
output and incomes, the share of the adult
population actually working is critical. In Atlantic
Canada, the labour-market participation of working-
age people has tended to be lower than elsewhere in
the country. Although intervals of low workforce
participation may be due to weak demand for
workers, persistently low rates indicate a problem on
the supply side.
One inhibitor of a better performing Atlantic
Canada labour market is the regionally linked benefit
system of the federal Employment Insurance (EI)
program. While generous EI benefits can induce
people to join the labour force, thereby boosting
participation rates, they will discourage workers who
are seasonally unemployed or affected by permanent
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
8 Although Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick also offer child/family benefits, these programs are too small to affect
these calculations. Per capita education-related data are from Blouin (2008). A substantial proportion of students attending university in Nova
Scotia are from out of province: we allow for a recent downtrend in this share by raising the proportion of home-based students in our
projections from 40 percent to 50 percent over 10 years, and holding it constant thereafter. 
9 For comparison with the figures, Robson’s (2009) results see national average healthcare costs rising from 7 percent of GDP per year in 2008 to 10
percent of GDP in 2030, and total demographically sensitive costs rising from 15 percent to 19 percent of GDP over the same period.| 10 Backgrounder 120






















































































































































































































Figure 7: Demographically Sensitive Programs Under Alternative Scenarios 
Source: CANSIM, Authors’ calculations.Backgrounder 120 | 11
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
change in the economy from moving to places where
opportunities may be better but EI benefits are
lower. While the program’s tendency to keep
working-age people in the Atlantic region when they
have better prospects elsewhere might seem an
advantage from a demographic point of view, from
an economic point of view it is not. There is
evidence that the lack of uniformity in the EI
program creates long-lasting pockets of high
unemployment in Atlantic Canada’s more rural
regions (Guillemette 2007). 
Another inhibitor of better labour-market
performance in Atlantic Canada is skill depletion
among discouraged unemployed workers. At the
same time, pockets of high unemployment
pressure the health and cohesion of communities,
thus representing a significant misallocation of
resources. Employment searches may last a long
time – as evidenced by the Atlantic provinces’
relatively high long-term unemployment rate –
and can lead workers to withdraw from the labour
force (Busby 2008). Building the political will for
universality in EI’s access requirements and benefit
duration or, at a minimum, some form of
portability in benefits, would likely provide a boost
to a labour force that is less well deployed than 
the national average. 
An aging population naturally focuses attention
on policies affecting older actual and potential
workers. A combination of government program
incentives, in addition to personal wealth and job
prospects, incent older workers to withdraw from the
labour force. Later retirement, however, can boost
output and incomes, especially in an aging
population. Over the last three decades, participation
rates among older workers have declined for men
and risen for women, and the historic more than 20-
percentage-point gender gap is expected to narrow
further as more educated cohorts of women stay in
the workforce longer (Figure 8). For policymakers,
cross-regional differences suggest that policies can
affect these trends.
The most palatable reforms that target older
workers would aim to make retirement decisions
more neutral, as opposed to encouraging either early
or late retirement. Because present federal programs
tends to encourage early retirement (Tompa 1999),
one option is to increase the benefit entitlement of
later retirement in the Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
relative to early retirement, moving the plan closer 
to actuarial neutrality.10 Other options include
sheltering GIS recipients from clawbacks of increased
CPP benefits related to delayed retirement, (Milligan
2005), and increasing the threshold eligibility ages
for OAS, GIS and CPP to reflect increases in
available working life and life expectancy.
The proposed removing of the early work-cessation
test – which requires individuals who start their CPP
pension before age 65 to either stop work or reduce
their earnings – from the CPP in 2012 would reduce
one incentive to leave the workforce. Delaying the 
age when contributions to private pension plans and
RRSPs must cease could also help. Though many
reforms that target older worker participation are
Ottawa’s responsibility, the Atlantic provinces control
seniors’ programs and other relevant frameworks such
as pension regulation. Since the provinces are affected
by federal policies that discourage work among older
people, they have an interest in changes to those
policies, and their dealings with Ottawa on pension
and other issues should reflect that fact.
The private sector must also shoulder some of 
the responsibility for better workforce retention.
Succession planning in Atlantic Canadian small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for example, is a
particularly important issue for the region (Dodds
2009). In this regard, the creation of flexible retire-
ment schedules and other incentives could help firms
retain workers more effectively than government
reforms alone can do. 
While each of these options has merit, working on
this front alone has limited scope to mitigate
demographically driven costs and slower workforce
growth (Busby, forthcoming). McNiven (2009) has
found that a highly unrealistic increase in aggregate
participation rates of 0.5 percentage points per year
would be necessary to offset the impact of changes in
the population structure to meet future workforce
demand. So policymakers seeking to more fully
protect living standards in the Atlantic provinces from
demographic pressure must look to other tools as well.
10 The May 25, 2009 information paper by the federal Department of Finance has modestly proposed such reforms for the CPP by increasing the
early pension reduction to 0.6 percent per month for each month that a pension is taken before age 65; and augmenting late pension benefits by
0.7 percent per month for each month that the pension is taken after age 65.| 12 Backgrounder 120
International and Interprovincial Immigration
As noted already, a probable key factor in the
Atlantic provinces’ generally lower net in-migration
rates is the trend to greater population growth in
urban compared to rural regions. If attracting
migrants to rural areas is a goal, awarding additional
points within the Provincial Nominee Program
(PNP) system for immigrants with occupations
likelier to reside in these areas could help. So could
more points for potential applicants with family or
community ties in rural regions, targeting applicants
who are likelier to stay. 
Larger centres, however, seem to have more
attraction power. Metropolitan population growth
rates in Atlantic Canada and other provinces are
relatively similar (Figure 9). Sometimes, they are even
in Atlantic Canada’s favour. For example, in the
“smaller metropolitan” categories, which range in size
from 50,000 to 249,999 persons, those in New
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador grow at
a faster rate than those in Ontario and Saskatchewan
from 2001 to 2006. 
The 2007 federal budget created new rules for an
“experience class” of immigrants, which makes it
easier for certain temporary workers and interna-
tional students enrolled at Canadian postsecondary
institutions to become permanent residents and,
ultimately, citizens. Because of its large base of





































































































































Figure 8: Past and Projected Participation Rates (ages 55+), 1978–2038
Note: Dynamic calculations for these figures not in text. Contact authors for more information.
Source: Busby (forthcoming).Backgrounder 120 | 13
benefit from this change. A larger role for businesses
in ensuring that immigrants have work upon arrival
and exposure to the local culture – factors that
improve the likelihood that they will stay where they
first arrive could also help. 
Improved tools to reduce interprovincial migration
flows of young graduates are another policy option.
For instance, the Nova Scotia Graduate Tax Credit
allows for a one-time $2,000 income-tax reduction
that can be claimed immediately after graduation.
Hence, it is weakly contingent on individuals staying
and working in the province. New Brunswick, on the
other hand, offers tax and tuition rebates that are
directly contingent upon graduates staying within the
province. New Brunswick offers a large tax reduction
– $4,000 per year over a five-year period – and a 50
percent tuition rebate that takes 20 years to fully
claim (Schirle 2009). For such policies to be effective
in keeping more graduates within the region, they
need to follow more closely the New Brunswick
design. Further, provinces may want to consider
extending the length of tax reductions and allow
them to increase in size each year over a longer, 10-
year post-graduation period.
Making Workers More Productive 
Whether or not the Atlantic provinces are successful
at blunting historically strong out-migration forces,
efforts must also target productivity improvements in
a local workforce that is likely to contract in the years
ahead. Underperforming educational institutions are
never acceptable: as fewer youth enter the labour
force, the basic and higher skills of each person take
on even more importance. If we rank the provinces
among the 57 countries in the key “combined math”
scores from the latest Programme for International
Student Assessment round, where Canada as a whole
rank 10th, Newfoundland and Labrador ranked
18th, Nova Scotia 21st, New Brunswick 24th and
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Figure 9: Urban/Rural Population Growth Rates, 2001–2006
Source: Authors’ calculation from Statistics Canada 2001 and 2006 Census.| 14 Backgrounder 120
P.E.I. 30th (Appendix Figure A1). Compared to the
other Canadian provinces, the Atlantic provinces
tend to rank among the lowest (Buissière et al.
2007).11
Future jobs will increasingly require postsecondary
education training, highlighting the key role of the
postsecondary education system in boosting
workforce productivity. With the right amount of
ongoing improvement, the stock of universities and
colleges in Atlantic Canada today should provide a
solid base to help cope with demographic change.
The human capital challenge continues later in
life. The Atlantic provinces, indeed Canada generally,
tend to lag behind other OECD countries in adult
literacy scores and skill accumulations – key drivers
of productivity and economic growth (Coulombe
and Tremblay 2005). Over half of Atlantic
Canadians 16 and over – nearly one million people –
suffer from low literacy (Appendix Figure A2).
Although Nova Scotia’s performane is better than
average, roughly 21 percent of Atlantic Canadian
adults perform at the lowest level of literacy, Level 1,
while 30 percent have the second-lowest level of
proficiency, Level 2 (ABC 2005). As rapid techno-
logical change forces workers to switch occupations
over their working careers, low investments in adult
training will limit the adaptability of workers, thus
hindering the ability of regions to cope with demo-
graphic change. Greater acquisition and retention of
these skills by adults is an important potential route
to raise productivity and living standards.
The ability of workers to accomplish more with
equal effort also rests on investing in the tools
workers need to do the job. Regions with high levels
of investment per worker increase their overall
competitiveness and living standards. Setting aside
Newfoundland and Labrador, where resource
industries have boosted these figures, the rest of
Atlantic Canada’s performance on this score is weak
(Appendix Figure A3). On average, workers in the
Atlantic Provinces receive 75 cents for every dollar of
investment in plant and equipment enjoyed by
workers in Canada as a whole. Improving regional
labour mobility, worker skills and more competitive
tax regimes – along the lines that New Brunswick is
designing – would enhance the attractiveness of the
region as a place to invest. 
Businesses in New Brunswick and
Newfoundland and Labrador face some of the
lowest marginal tax rates in Canada (Mintz and
Chen 2009). This could also explain, in part, why
their investment per worker performance is above
that in the other two Atlantic provinces. Moving
from an old retail sales tax to a value-added tax
through GST harmonization would reduce
marginal tax rates in P.E.I., and both Nova Scotia
and P.E.I. could further improve their relative tax
position on the cost of doing business if relatively
high statutory corporate tax rates were lowered.
That said, overall tax levels not only affect today’s
investment decisions, but the revenues raised from
them also affect the size and scope of future public
programs – a question to which we now turn. 
Preparing for Demographic Pressure on 
Key Public Programs
The future stability and competitiveness of provincial
taxes in Atlantic Canada depends on their
governments’ ability to contain the rapidly escalating
costs of healthcare. In the past two decades, Atlantic
provinces have seen real revenues grow alongside the
economy, increasing from roughly $5,500 per capita
in 1986/87 to $8,300 in 2007/08, a growth rate of
1.9 percent annually. Over this same period, real per-
capita public-health expenditure rose from $1,600 in
1986/87 to $3,100 in 2007/08, a rate of 3 percent
annually. Service limits and more urban-focused
service delivery can reduce these growth rates, but
more fundamental changes must occur if tax burdens
are not to rise intolerably.
One option is to prefund some healthcare
programs whose costs are clearly about to rise
(Robson 2002). For example, one program whose
costs are climbing faster than others is family and
senior pharmacare. Consider some additional
scenarios – none remotely unreasonable – for
increases in the cost of drug benefit programs in
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In a 4 percent
growth-per-person scenario, public drug
C.D. Howe Institute
11 In spite of these low average scores, another worrisome result from the recent PISA round is the variance. Rather than having a large cluster of
students performing around the lower average results, the Atlantic Provinces have a relatively small proportion of high-performing students and
a large proportion of poor performing ones (Buissière et al., 26, Table 1.3). Backgrounder 120 | 15
expenditures in Nova Scotia will rise to 2 percent of
GDP from about 0.9 percent currently in 50 years’
time. In a 6 percent growth scenario, the cost
increase will be to 5.2 percent of GDP. For New
Brunswick, the share of drug benefit expenses would
rise from about 0.6 percent of GDP today to 0.9
percent in a 4 percent scenario and to 2.4 percent in
a 6 percent growth scenario, over a 50-year period.12
Prefunding along lines similar to the changes that
stabilized the Canada Pension Plan would require
babyboomers to pay more into a fund before they
begin drawing from it, levelling the cost over time.
Using the most recent data, and targeting an asset-
expenditure ratio of five in 50 years’ time – much
like the CPP reforms – we project the required level
of prefunding in Appendix Table A3.The net
contributions required to stabilize the cost of these
programs are not trivial – several hundred dollars per
adult, depending on cost escalation and returns on
invested funds – but they would reduce the
intergenerational stresses of these programs and likely
ensure their survival for years to come.
Barring a quick turnaround in economic
expansion for most Atlantic provinces, the growing
levels of expenditures due to an aging population will
place notable stress and attention on the horizontal
equity of federal transfers to the provinces, especially
the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) (Ruggeri 2009).
One solution for avoiding a major reworking of the
CHT would be for the federal government to create
a seniors’ health grant that would automatically
cushion provinces from some of the consequences of
different aging rates (Robson 2001). The alternative
of ad hoc increases in response to emergency
provincial funding needs is much less promising. 
Conclusion 
Without large future increases in output per
working-age person in the Atlantic provinces, a
shrinking workforce – which may be the case as soon
as 2010 – will dampen future economic growth.
Even if the trends of net outmigration were to reverse
in coming years, slower growth in output and
incomes per person are likely. Aging populations also
mean that the Atlantic provinces should expect
demographically driven program spending to
outpace growth in the tax base. 
To limit increases in their tax burdens, the Atlantic
provinces could prefund the pharmacare element of
their healthcare programs. The Atlantic provinces
must also devote energy to attract more immigrants,
likely through a targeted PNP, and look at how
policies for the postsecondary education system and
its larger cities can further the goal of attracting and
retaining working-age people.
As well, workforce mobility and flexibility could
be improved by removing the disincentives to move
inherent in a regionally linked EI program. Future
prospects would also improve were Atlantic regions
to work with the federal government to reduce the
incentives for older workers to leave the workforce.
The overall demographic challenge is a daunting
one – too large for any single policy change to
improve decisively. All the more reason, then, for an
early start on the many fronts – migration, education
and skills training, investment and fiscal programs –
that taken together, can help Atlantic Canada
prosper in the years ahead. 
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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2008 2018 2028 2038 2048 2058
(estimates)
Assumptions
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Newfoundland and Labrador
Male 75.8 77.4 78.7 79.7 80.7 81.7
Female 81.3 82.9 83.9 84.9 85.9 86.9
Prince Edward Island
Male 76.8 78.1 79.1 80.1 81.1 82.1
Female 81.6 83.2 84.2 85.2 86.2 87.2
Nova Scotia
Male 76.5 78.1 79.1 80.1 81.1 82.1
Female 81.6 83.2 84.2 85.2 86.2 87.2
New Brunswick
Male 77.0 78.3 79.3 80.3 81.3 82.3
Female 82.2 83.5 84.5 85.5 86.5 87.5
Total Fertility Rate
Newfoundland and Labrador 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46
Prince Edward Island 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63
Nova Scotia 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
New Brunswick 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
Net International Migration (persons)
Newfoundland and Labrador
Optimistic  Migration Scenario 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Pessimistic Migration Scenario 259 259 259 259 259 259
Prince Edward Island
Optimistic Scenario 1,790 1,790 1,790 1,790 1,790 1,790
Pessimistic Scenario 351 351 351 351 351 351
Nova Scotia 
Optimistic Scenario 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
Pessimistic Scenario 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179
New Brunswick
Optimistic Scenario 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100
Pessimistic Scenario 619 619 619 619 619 619
Atlantic Canada
Optimistic Scenario 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pessimistic Scenario 2,408 2,408 2,408 2,408 2,408 2,408
Net Interprovincial Migration (persons)
Newfoundland and Labrador
Optimistic Scenario 150 150 150 150 150 150
Pessimisic Scenario -3,281 0 0 0 0 0
Prince Edward Island
Optimistic Scenario 597 597 597 597 597 597
Pessimistic Scenario -68 0 0 0 0 0
Nova Scotia
Optimistic Scenario 360 360 360 360 360 360
Pessimistic Scenario -1,377 0 0 0 0 0
New Brunswick
Optimistic Scenario 510 510 510 510 510 510
Pessimistic Scenario -1,545 0 0 0 0 0
Atlantic Canada
Optimistic Scenario 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617
Pessimistic Scenario -6,271 0 0 0 0 0
Table A1: Projection Assumptions and Results Appendix 
Source: CANSIM, Authors’ calculations.Backgrounder 120 | 17




Newfoundland and Labrador 508
Optimistic Scenario 522 527 516 497 479
Pessimistic Scenario 487 471 441 401 363
Prince Edward Island 140
Optimistic Scenario 166 193 218 242 266
Pessimistic Scenario 144 147 146 143 140
Nova Scotia 938
Optimistic Scenario 980 1,010 1,016 1,011 1,005
Pessimistic Scenario 940 934 898 849 799
New Brunswick 747
Optimistic Scenario 796 851 889 919 951
Pessimistic Scenario 742 732 700 654 607
Atlantic Canada 2,333
Optimistic Scenario 2,464 2,581 2,639 2,669 2,701
Pessimistic Scenario 2,313 2,284 2,185 2,047 1,909
Working-Age Population (000s) 
Newfoundland and Labrador 340
Optimistic Scenario 328 303 286 281 264
Pessimistic Scenario 301 264 232 213 195
Prince Edward Island 89 
Optimistic Scenario 104 116 130 145 156
Pessimistic Scenario 89 83 81 81 77
Nova Scotia 614
Optimistic Scenario 617 583 580 586 565
Pessimistic Scenario 587 526 492 467 427
New Brunswick 489
Optimistic Scenario 502 499 517 544 553
Pessimistic Scenario 462 414 381 355 323
Atlantic Canada 1,532
Optimistic Scenario 1,551 1,501 1,513 1,556 1,538
Pessimistic Scenario 1,439 1,287 1,186 1,116 1,022
Old-Age Dependency (65+ / 18-64) (%)
Newfoundland and Labrador 21.6
Optimistic Scenario 32.4 45.9 52.1 49.6 53.1
Pessimistic Scenario 35.3 52.1 62.8 61.9 60.6
Prince Edward Island 23.7
Optimistic Scenario 27.5 33.2 35.4 35.0 38.4
Pessimistic Scenario 32.1 44.4 48.7 46.5 50.0
Nova Scotia 23.5
Optimistic Scenario 30.8 42.6 46.2 43.9 48.3
Pessimistic Scenario 32.6 47.7 54.4 53.7 58.1
New Brunswick 23.2
Optimistic Scenario 30.5 40.0 42.1 39.9 42.1
Pessimistic Scenario 33.3 48.3 56.0 57.0 60.0
Atlantic Canada 23.0
Optimistic Scenario 30.8 41.7 45.0 42.7 45.9
Pessimistic Scenario 33.3 48.6 56.2 55.8 58.5
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Table A1 (continued)





Newfoundland and Labrador 3.57




Atlantic Provinces  1.63
Newfoundland and Labrador 1.74





Newfoundland and Labrador 1.78
Prince Edward Island 1.71
Nova Scotia 1.53
New Brunswick 1.67
Table A2: Annual Real GDP per capita Growth Under Various Scenarios, Actual and Projected Appendix 
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Figure A1: The Atlantic Provinces’ PISA Scores versus National Average, 2006
Source: Buissère et al. (2007).
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Figure A3: Atlantic Canada Can Equip Workers Better: Investment per Worker, 1999 to 2009 (est.)
Source: Busby and Robson (2009).
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2009 Contribution as  Contribution Net contribution Unfunded
Amount share of GDP per person 18+ per person 18+ liability
$ billion % $ $ $ billion
Nova Scotia
Optimistic Scenario
Return on Fund Assets: 3%
Spending Growth 4% 0.6 1.6 723 309 9.4
Spending Growth 6% 1.0 2.9 1,352 929 30.0
Return on Fund Assets: 5%
Spending Growth 4% 0.5 1.4 662 247 5.1
Spending Growth 6% 0.9 2.5 1,144 721 15.3
Pessimistic Scenario
Return on Fund Assets: 3%
Spending Growth 4% 0.6 1.8 828 412 11.8
Spending Growth 6% 1.2 3.4 1,561 1,136 32.9
Return on Fund Assets: 5%
Spending Growth 4% 0.6 1.6 748 332 6.5
Spending Growth 6% 1.0 2.8 1,303 879 17.1
New Brunswick
Optimistic Scenario
Return on Fund Assets: 3%
Spending Growth 4% 0.3 0.9 416 148 3.9
Spending Growth 6% 0.5 1.7 784 511 15.3
Return on Fund Assets: 5%
Spending Growth 4% 0.3 0.8 385 116 2.1
Spending Growth 6% 0.4 1.5 671 397 7.8
Pessimistic Scenario
Return on Fund Assets: 3%
Spending Growth 4% 0.4 1.2 546 266 6.4
Spending Growth 6% 0.6 2.1 955 681 16.7
Return on Fund Assets: 5%
Spending Growth 4% 0.3 1.1 490 209 3.4
Spending Growth 6% 0.5 1.8 797 523 8.6
Table A3 : Contribution Rates to Stabilize Cost of Pharmacare over 50 Years Appendix 
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in text.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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